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Commentary & Reply
Komer, CORDS, and Pacification
To the Editor:
Students of pacification and counterinsurgency should thank Frank L. Jones
for a lively examination of the role organizational management plays in such strategies (“Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy,”
Parameters, Autumn 2005). But his analysis, however interesting, fails to enlighten. As Jones himself concedes at the article’s close, despite the fiery efforts of
professionals like Robert Komer, pacification failed in Vietnam. Jones’s gloss on
this failure, however, is too brief and too glib to be of much use to the practical
decisionmaker. In fact, he misses a golden opportunity to highlight the importance
of going beyond issues of organization in crafting a successful pacification policy.
At times, Jones seems to sympathize with his Vietnam-era bureaucratic
subjects, who perceived pacification chiefly as an internal problem of management and resource allocation. This view presumed that the United States armed
and diplomatic forces could win “hearts and minds” with enough materiel, manpower, fortitude, and unified organizational charts. Perhaps this is why Jones heralds the development of CORDS as an advance, when in fact more perceptive
observers—who were responsible for the pacification mission in the field—saw
the full militarization of pacification as the beginning of the end in Vietnam.
Colonel William Corson, commander of the Marines’ pacification program, documented the failures of Komer’s “managerial” mindset in his chronicle
of Vietnam failure, The Betrayal. Corson praised the CORDS director’s efforts
but perceived that the new organization was led more by intentions than knowhow: “Komer the manager was not Komer the leader . . . . Komer made it plain to
the CORDS people that they were going to do better and were going to operate as
a team, but then he neglected to make clear exactly what they were to do. As a result, CORDS continued to operate inefficient programs in an efficient manner.”
Charts and figures could be assembled (or fabricated, as was common practice) to
gauge progress in pounds of rice distributed or numbers of hamlets pacified, but
these quantitative measures hardly reflected the political and strategic reality on
the ground. In fact, despite Jones’s suggestions to the contrary, there is no shortage of documentary and anecdotal evidence that free-flowing CORDS aid lined
the pockets of South Vietnamese generals and bureaucrats, deepening the corruption problem, not solving it.
What is worse, in choosing to focus on arbitrary managerial measures of effectiveness, Komer’s bureaucracy paid virtually no attention to the mission, enemy,
and terrain that pacification was supposed to deal with. In the best of circumstances, elements such as Colonel Corson’s Marines were permitted to run pacification locally, independently, and somewhat effectively; in the worst, commanders
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took their marching orders directly from the US Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV) commander (and, by extension, the CORDS commander), General William Westmoreland, whose lack of zeal for pacification was well-known.
In fact, it never seems to occur to Jones that by inviting all pacification efforts together under the MACV umbrella, Westmoreland and the Army intended to
make those programs less effective, not more so. Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,
stops short of arguing this point, but in The Army and Vietnam he does note that
even after the birth of CORDS, Army brass sought to fight the Vietnam War more
conventionally with more regular troops, in line with the Army’s traditional doctrine of attrition of enemy forces. Krepinevich details a CIA-led pacification program in 1963 that failed after MACV reassigned the Special Forces soldiers who
had been charged with carrying the program out. “The Army,” he surmises, “was
bent on diverting the Special Forces to more traditional operations than those involved in pacification.”
Such evidence reinforces the sense that no matter what resources the military had at its command, its counterinsurgency efforts were halfhearted and misguided: their expertise was in achieving tactical successes, not political ones, and
so they attempted to wage what was essentially a political, unconventional war
with politically counterproductive, conventional tactics. Military efforts at pacification were the exception that proved this rule.
Frank Jones brings considerable knowledge and personal experience to
bear on a discussion of pacification—no idle discussion, given our current
counterterrorist and counterinsurgent operations worldwide. Thus he must recognize that the true lesson of Komer’s Vietnam odyssey is this: no amount of good
intentions or bureaucratic innovations can save a policy that founders on its own
doctrinal dogmas.
Adam Weinstein
Tallahassee, Florida
The Author Replies:
President Eisenhower once remarked, “Good organization doesn’t guarantee success, but bad organization guarantees failure.” Robert Komer and his US
colleagues were not the only ones who “perceived pacification chiefly as an internal problem of management and resource allocation.” Sir Robert Thompson, the
noted counterinsurgency authority, underscored the criticality of management in
his book Defeating Communist Insurgency: “Unless an effective administration is
maintained and steadily improved by the recruitment and training of the best
young men in the country, national policies become meaningless because, without
the functioning of an effective administration, no policies can be carried out.”
To call the late William Corson “a more perceptive observer” suggests unfamiliarity with Corson and the context of his book. The Betrayal is part personal
account, part jeremiad. While it is a fascinating story, Corson’s objectivity and reliability as an evaluator of CORDS are questionable. First, Corson had his own
agenda. He headed the US Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam,
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a program that Komer admired but thought was an unrealistic pacification method
because of the resources required to run it. Second, Corson’s condemnation of
CORDS, which he unfairly ties to USAID’s shortcomings, focuses primarily on
the period when Komer arrives and is trying to establish CORDS, a time of considerable turbulence. Overall, Corson’s account lacks emotional and chronological distance to be a solid basis for evaluation. It is for this reason that I relied on
the historian Richard Hunt’s book, the most comprehensive assessment to date.
It is nonsense to argue that Komer and his colleagues focused on “arbitrary
managerial measures of effectiveness” and paid no attention to the “mission, enemy, and terrain.” Komer paid considerable attention to local security and attacking the Viet Cong command and control. Further, in reference to rampant
corruption, as I noted in my article, this was an issue of considerable concern to
Komer. In the first four months of his tenure as deputy for CORDS, he prodded
the government of South Vietnam to fire dozens of province and district chiefs
for corruption and incompetence. While it is true that Komer and his colleagues
made use of metrics, they confronted the very real issue of how to measure success in “a feeling war with no fronts and no rear,” as John Steinbeck described
the conflict in his dispatches for Newsday. Further, CORDS was foremost designed to prompt the Vietnamese to take charge of the pacification, a massive undertaking which remains unappreciated, involving more than 12,000 hamlets.
A closer reading of Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam and my
article is warranted. I never argued that putting the military in charge of pacification would make it more or less effective. Komer made the argument that it
would be more effective for the reasons cited in the article. Krepinevich documents the limitations that Westmoreland placed on Komer’s plans for pacification. As Krepinevich states, “Although the civilians could not get the Army to
modify its approach to the war, they could at least divert some Army resources to
pacification and pull some Army officers along in their wake.”
Lastly, US pacification efforts cannot be easily dismissed, although Komer
admitted that the program was not a resounding success. Others believed it did
work. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., in his book The 25-Year War, indicated, “By the
end of 1970, and certainly by mid-1971, the pacification campaign was well on
the way to success.” Part of this success is because of the efforts of Robert
Komer as policy formulator and deputy for CORDS.
Frank Jones
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